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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper highlights some of the issues that arise when focusing on 
inequality (and similar notions) as participants’ concerns. It emphasises the 
value of understanding constructions of inequality in terms of how they are (a) 
oriented to action; (b) situated (sequentially, institutionally, rhetorically); and 
(c) constructed from discursive resources and constructive of social and 
mental worlds. These points are illustrated with an example from a call to a 
child protection helpline. This illustrates how a particular description of 
inequality can be oriented to action, constructed and situated. This is the 
basis for some more general observations on the nature of inequality as an 
object in interaction. 
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Introduction  
One way of understanding social inequality (and similar notions) is to 
take an approach which starts (although does not necessarily finish) with the 
discursive practices of participants in particular settings. How is ‘inequality’, 
for instance, invoked as part of an action in a family, say? Such an approach 
has been developed within some traditions of discourse analysis, rhetoric, and 
discursive psychology (Billig, 1996; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996; 
Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992), drawing on thinking in 
ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967) and conversation analysis (Sacks, 1992). 
This approach highlights three aspects of discourse: action orientation, 
situation, and construction. The next three points briefly say something about 
each.   
 1. Action orientation.  
Discourse is the primary medium of human action and interaction. 
Actions are typically embedded in broader practices. Some are generic 
(‘complaining’); some are specific to settings (‘requesting a bank overdraft 
facility’). The idea of action orientation discourages the expectation that 
analysis will discover a one-to-one relation where discrete acts are performed 
by discrete verbs. Starting with action encourages one to think about the ways 
in which constructions of ‘inequality’ can be used to do things.  
2. Situation.  
Discourse is situated in three senses. First, it is organized sequentially, 
such that the primary environment of what is said is what has just come 
before, and this sets up (although does not determine) what comes next. 
Second, discourse may be situated institutionally, such that institutional 
identities (social worker, say) and tasks (managing neutrality with respect to 
different clients) may be relevant to (although not determine) what takes 
place. Third, discourse can be situated rhetorically, such that descriptions 
may resist actual or potential attempts to counter them as interested. A 
spouse’s construction of their problems in a relationship counselling session 
may be designed to counter their partner’s version.  
 3. Construction. 
 
Discourse is constructed and constructive. It is constructed in the 
sense that it is built from various resources (words, of course, but also 
categories, commonplace ideas, interpretative repertoires, broader 
explanatory systems). It is constructive in the sense that versions of the world, 
of events and actions, and of people’s phenomenological worlds are built and 
stabilized in talk in the course of actions. A person may account for missing a 
meeting by offering a version of the city’s traffic problems, or of their own 
faulty mental processes. The form of construction here is distinct from some 
other varieties of social constructionism. It is focused on the constructions of 
participants in their talk and texts. The focus is therefore on specific 
descriptions or conversations, and what they are being used to do. It 
appreciates the enormous sophistication of people as world constructors, and 
the elaborate set of resources that they have available for building 
constructions, as well as the further set of resources that can be used to tear 
them down (Billig, 1996; Potter, 1996).  
This approach cuts across the traditional individual/social 
(psychology/sociology) dualism, as well as the traditional micro/macro 
division. It does this through its focus on the way both psychology and society 
are ‘produced’ (described, invoked, categorized) for action and interaction. 
This is an inversion of the traditional explanatory mode in social science 
where action is explained by reference to inner psychological entities 
(attitudes, motives) or broader social processes (group allegiance, 
persuasion). Here the focus is on what people are doing (actions, as parts of 
practices in settings) and how versions of mind or the social world are drawn 
on (using a mix of somewhat bespoke and somewhat off-the-shelf discursive 
resources) to serve these actions (Potter, 1996; Wetherell, 1998). People 
describe the world, formulating particulars that are relevant, simultaneously 
describing its social organization, providing its moral flavour and highlighting 
its causal power; and people describe cognition, formulating an inner life of 
beliefs, motives and feelings that make their actions accountable. 
There have been a range of studies of inequality using a discourse 
approach of this kind over the past 20 years. Some studies have focused on 
constructions of gender, social class and employment (Billig, 1993; Gill, 1993; 
Riley, 2002; Wetherell, et al., 1987); others have considered issues of 
inequality and affirmative action (Potter & Wetherell, 1989; Augoustinos, 
Tuffin & Every, 2005) particularly in the context of racism (Augoustinos, Tuffin 
& Rapley, 1999; Edwards, 2004; Tileagă, 2005, 2006; Verkuyten, 1998, 2001, 
2003; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Much of this work is based on open ended 
interviews and drawn on discourse analytic notions such as interpretative 
repertoires (Potter et al., 1990) and ideological dilemmas (Billig et al., 1988). 
Important and influential though this work is, there are limits to what can be 
achieved when working with interview materials (see Potter & Hepburn, in 
press, for reasons why) and more recent work has started to focus on 
materials derived from natural settings. This change of focus has led 
discourse researchers to draw more on the analytic perspective of 
conversation analysis (Wooffitt, 2005). We are not here going to spend much 
time reviewing earlier work – (for that see Hepburn, 2003; Speer, 2005 and 
Wetherell, Taylor & Yates, 2001a,b). Our current paper has two main aims. 
First, it will illustrate the operation of the action-situation-construction scheme 
outlined above with a particular extract. Second, it will highlight the complexity 
and specificity of addressing inequality as an interactional object. 
 
Inequality in an institutional setting 
The example comes from a project that is studying the work of the UK 
National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children’s child protection 
helpline (see Hepburn, 2004; Hepburn, 2005; Hepburn & Potter, 2004; Potter 
& Hepburn, 2003, 2005). The helpline receives more than a quarter of a 
million calls a year and provides information, advice and counselling to 
anyone concerned about a child’s safety. The focus has been on studying the 
way the calls are organized with the analytic aim of explicating issues about 
activity, mind and description and the practical aim of supporting the training 
and effectiveness of the helpline. All the Child Protection Officers who take 
calls on the helpline have three years field social work experience. One of its 
principal roles is to refer information about abuse to the relevant social 
services departments.  
How should one look for ‘inequality’ in this helpline? One of the radical 
issues that confronts researchers in moving to look at participants’ 
orientations, or members’ concerns, or people’s own categories is that they 
are unlikely to map onto our social science categories in any clear-cut way. 
Inequality is part of the language of social theory but much less a part of 
everyday and institutional interaction. For example, a search through all of the 
files on one of our PCs containing a career’s worth of writing and several data 
archives on (including transcripts of more than 250 NSPCC calls) finds 170 
instances of the term ‘inequality’, but not a single one of these comes from a 
data file. There is a highly unequal distribution of ‘inequality’! However, the 
weakness of focusing on members’ concerns is that it can pull the focus of 
research away from the very real and important issues that stimulate research 
on such topics. The strength of focusing on members’ concerns is that it can 
lead to novel understandings of actions, events and what is important. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting for this exercise to look for an example that links 
to traditional ideas about inequality. The extract that follows was chosen 
because the CPO invokes a category of being ‘on benefits’. From a classic 
sociological account this would be a category of people who are poor, 
disadvantaged, perhaps an ‘underclass’. The analysis will focus on precisely 
how this description is used and what it might be doing within this institutional 
setting. It can be an object to discipline reflection on analysis and theory.  
The segment below starts from early in the call, immediately after the 
caller has agreed to take part in the study. It reproduces the opening minutes 
of a 12 minute call to give readers a feel of how such a call unfolds (see 
appendix for transcription conventions). 
 
 
WO neighbour concern  
 
1 CPO:   =↑How can I help.  
2 Caller:  . Hhh right (0.2) .hh ↑u:m:  
3   a-a’m u:m:: (0.7) jus-just a  
4   neighbour an I wa:lk ma dog an a’m  
5   .hh actually s:ick an tired(.)  
6   .hh (0.2) of the: (0.3) er:  
7   verbal abuse that I ‘ear when  
8   a walk past the house.  
9   (0.2)  
10 Caller:  .hh[h that] a mum is givin  
11 CPO:      [Right.]  
12 Caller:   to ‘er kids.  
13   (0.2)  
14   .hh[h]  
15 CPO:      [R]ight,=  
16 Caller:   =An a’ve actually ↑stood beyind ‘er in a (.) .hh  
17   (0.2) ↑local shop an  
18   see:n .h (0.2) what she fee:ds the  
19   children an a think it’s disgus:tin.  
20 CPO:   Okay:, (0.2)  
21 Caller:   Yeh=  
22 CPO:   =D’ye wanna tell me a little bit  
23   about what-what’s goin on?  
24 Caller:   WELL EVery time you walk past she is  
25   EFF:in an BLI:N:din an carryin on.  
26 CPO:   Right,=  
27 Caller:   =The hou:se is absolu:tely: (0.2)  
28   filthy I’ve seen the door open.  
29 CPO:   Right,  
30 Caller:   Ye know, (0.3) an a mean: er::  
31   (0.6) kids are kids:.  
32   (0.3)  
33 CPO:   M[hm:. ]  
34 Caller:       [Ye kn]ow, (.) .hh (0.2) a:m::  
35   an i-it’s got to the stage where  
36   a-a’m ↑‘avin to walk me dog a different  
37   way cos a’m getting really upset  
38   o:[ver it.]  
39 CPO:     [ M m ]:.  
40   (0.2)  
41   Mm[:.]  
42     Caller:                    [Ye] know .hh (.) an a mean a’ve  
43   seen ‘er .hh (.) in the shop on a tea  
44   time (0.2) .hh buyin for the children’s  
45   tea >an a mean< she’s (0.2) .hh she’s  
46   three(.) .hh (0.4) chubby ki:ds.   
47     CPO:   Mm.  
48   (0.3)  
49     Caller:   But (0.2) to me what they’re fed is:  
50   (0.3) is all wrong.  
51     CPO:   Right.=what’ve you see ‘er buy:in then.  
52     Caller:   WELL ER:m:: (.) a pack of eight sausages.  
53     CPO:   Mm[ : ,]  
54     Caller:   [An a] bag of fro:zen chips.  
55   (0.3)  
56     CPO:   Mm:,  
57   (0.4)  
58     Caller:   Ye know.  
59   (0.4)  
60   Er::m an a loafa bread >an a mean she<  
61   shops daily.  
62     CPO:   Mm. N-w- some people do do: that.=don’t  
63   they.=>a [m’n< i-]i- ye know is she on  
64     Caller:                               [ Yeh. ]  
65     CPO:   benefi:ts.=cos that-that’s not unusual  
66   if [somebody’s on benefits yeah ]  
67     Caller:         [Ye:s, she’s on benefits, but] er::  
68   (0.5) she’s got somebody else livin  
69   with her?  
70     CPO:  Ri:ght (.) [Right.] 
 
 
 
A series of observations about this material are offered. These are by no 
means exhaustive. The first two are general.  
 First, it is naturalistic.  In contrast to the vast majority of work in social 
sciences (including much ethnography) it uses material that is taken from an 
actual setting. It would have occurred in more or less this way if the 
researcher had not been interested in the material. We have called it 
naturalistic (rather than natural) in recognition of the potential for ‘reactivity’ in 
such records - Speer, 2002). Nevertheless, this situation is not flooded by 
categories introduced by the social researcher; nor are the participants 
speaking on the basis of identities pre-defined by the researcher (Edwards & 
Stokoe, 2005; Potter & Hepburn, in press).  
 Second, it uses transcript to capture features of speech delivery. In 
contrast to the majority of interview based research and ethnographic work 
the transcript uses conventions (developed by Gail Jefferson – e.g. Jefferson, 
1985) that are designed to capture features of speech delivery that are 
consequential for interaction. Overlap, delay, emphasis and various 
intonational contours are part of what gives talk its specific character. To wipe 
out such elements by turning it into playscript can lose elements that are 
crucial to participants and potentially important aids to analysis. The attempt 
to capture these elements is an attempt to capture the lived and embodied 
texture of talk.  
 
Inequality as an interactional object  
 The next three points are specific to the study and understanding of 
‘inequality’.  
First, one needs to be aware at the potential inequalities between the 
speakers. One can study inequalities between caller and CPO. There are a 
range of possibilities here – the Caller has called while the CPO has 
answered; the Caller is probably doing something unusual, the CPO is doing 
something they do all day every day; the Caller treats the CPO as knowing 
about child protection; the CPO treats the caller as knowing about this specific 
case. The nature, consequences and perhaps reworking of these things is a 
topic of study. There is a wide body of work in conversation analysis that has 
studied inequalities of this kind (for institutional example, see papers in Drew 
& Heritage, 1992; for examples considering gender see Speer (2005), Stokoe 
& Weatherall (2002), Kitzinger (2005)).  
Second, one needs to be able to describe how speakers construct and 
invoke inequalities in their talk. The focus on speaker’s constructions of 
inequality/equality in their talk is something that has been a topic in discourse 
analysis and discursive psychology for 20 years (Wetherell, et al., 1987; 
Wetherell & Potter, 1992). The challenge now is to move these problematics 
forward when working with naturalistic materials. Before moving onto our third 
point, an example is discussed from a range of possible ones in the longer 
sequence. The focus is on the CPO’s observations about ‘benefits’ on 62-66, 
and consider them in terms of the action-situation-construction scheme 
outlined above. Observations will be speculative and illustrative as the 
concern is with a single example rather than building the analysis by working 
with a collection. To suggest that someone is ‘on benefits’ is, loosely, to 
suggest that they are a recipient of state aid and therefore poor. They may be 
unemployed or working in a low income or part time occupation. In the 
abstract, then, it is a categorization for a range of disadvantaged groups in UK 
society. However, our discursive construction approach encourages us to look 
at the specifics of how this description is assembled and what it is doing.  
Note that the CPO’s turn from 62 to 66 is constructed from a series of 
elements that are delivered as a package. These can be teased out (lines 
renumbered for clarity of reference): 
  
1 CPO:   Mm.  
2   N-w- some people do do: that.  
3   =don’t they.=  
 
4   >a [m’n< i-]i-  
 
5     Caller:           [ Yeh. ]  
 
6      CPO:   ye know  
 
7   is she on benefi:ts.  
 
8   =cos that-that’s not unusual  
 
9   if [somebody’s on benefits yeah ]  
 
 
 After the acknowledgement on line 1 the CPO suggests ‘some people 
do do that’. This is vague both in the reference of ‘some people’ (although 
presumably the mother described by the caller a candidate) and of ‘that’ (is it 
shopping daily, or buying sausages and chips, or both?). This vagueness of 
reference should not be seen as a shortcoming; systematic vagueness of this 
kind makes the construction particularly hard to disagree with (Edwards & 
Potter, 1992). It is rhetorically robust (Billig, 1996) and offered contrastively 
(compare ‘they do that’ with ‘they do do that’ as it is in line 2). This 
construction presents what ‘some people’ do as scripted or standardized; in 
Edwards’ (1994, 1997) terms it is a ‘script formulation’. Edwards notes the 
way that script formulations present actions as normal, standard or expected, 
and are often contrasted with dispositional formulations which present actions 
as a product of features of individuals (their personality, views or moral 
shortcomings). Script formulations are a basic tool used by people when 
constructing and stabilizing particular versions of social order.  
 This script formulation is followed by the tag question ‘don’t they’ (line 
3). This projects agreement and the latching means that it is delivered before 
the caller can easily offer a response, certainly one that starts a new turn. The 
‘yeh’ in overlap provides the agreement that the tag question projects. The 
CPO continues ‘rushing through’ with the ‘I mean’ (‘a m’n’ – line 4) indicating 
further explication is to come and a ‘you know’. Although items like ‘you know’ 
are often treated as empty fillers, conversation and discourse work has 
highlighted some of the roles they perform in interaction. For example, 
Edwards (1997) notes the way ‘you know’ can be a claim to shared 
knowledge between speaker and recipient. In this case, the CPO is offering 
the point about ‘what people do’ as something that both parties may already 
know. The CPO then asks the caller if the person she is calling about is on 
benefits (line 7). Although one might think of this as part of the information 
gathering task of the NSPCC in preparation for making a possible referral, 
there are good reasons to think that, at least in this case, it is operating rather 
differently. Note in particular the way that what comes next is latched, heading 
off an immediate answer. The CPO offers this as an account for the behaviour 
of the person being called about.  
 Third, one needs to consider that constructions of inequality are part of 
actions. What one can see here is that the CPO has developed the 
construction of the person being on benefits as an account for their behaviour. 
It offers a way of seeing the (claimed) behaviour of the mother as normal or 
standard for people in that social category. More broadly this can be seen as 
part of the CPO testing the information in the call to establish whether it is 
appropriate for a referral.  There is some delicacy here. One way of hearing 
the CPO’s package here is as offering the possibility that the caller is 
displaying prejudices about someone who is economically disadvantaged. 
Presenting the mother’s actions as normative for people on benefits has the 
potential for casting the caller’s dispositional claims about abuse parenting as 
insensitive or prejudiced. However, it is a feature of institutional interaction of 
this kind that although there can be testing or claims there is a reluctance to 
move into explicit justifications or criticisms or other actions that invoke moral 
issues (Potter & Hepburn, 2005). It may well be that the tag questions and 
emphasis on shared knowledge may work against the explicit eruption of 
complaints or defences in the call.  
More broadly still the patterning here can be seen as reflecting basic 
institutional and epistemic inequalities. Callers and CPOs are in different 
positions with respect to the events. Put simply, callers know about the 
persons and events they are calling about, CPOs know about child protection. 
It is a bit more complex, however. Note, that callers’ knowledge of persons 
and events is not something assumed or simply present. After all, they could 
be imagining things, acting on the base of spite, or misunderstanding, or on 
general prejudices. For this reason, callers need to manage the epistemic 
basis of their claims. The caller here introduces a number of elements into the 
call that attend to epistemic issues. One element is the use of knowledge 
entitling categories such as ‘neighbour’ (line 4; see Potter, 1996). Another 
element is the reiterated walking of the dog (lines 4, 36-7). This is neat as it 
provides an appropriate basis for the caller having seen the problem 
behaviour. Walking the dog is both a regular activity (providing regular 
opportunity for observing) and one that you are required to do, so it 
counteracts ideas of nosiness or voyeurism. The caller’s stance is explicitly 
managed on lines 36-7 with the caller’s claim that she was being made upset. 
This does double duty in showing that she does not revel in other’s misfortune 
– she is not a ‘nosey neighbour’ (Stokoe & Hepburn, 2005) – and the 
mistreatment of the children is sufficient to be upsetting, and therefore an 
appropriate basis for calling the NSPCC. Another element managing the 
caller’s epistemics is what she can see and hear, for example, in the local 
shop or while walking past. This provides for the production of vivid detail 
(eight sausages, a pack of frozen chips) that further supports the caller’s 
membership of the knowledge entitling category ‘witness’ (Edwards & Potter, 
1992).  
The CPO does not have these specific epistemic resources. She 
cannot (easily) say that the verbal abuse doesn’t sound extreme or that the 
kids seem healthy enough. Instead, as we have seen she constructs her 
version using scripts and common knowledge. She deploys what ‘everybody’ 
knows about, for example, what poor people on benefits are like. This 
provides a basis for testing out the claims made by the caller in preparation 
for a possible referral. The general point here, then is that ‘inequality’ is 
invoked as part of the business of the institution.  
 
Conclusion and discussion 
 What this paper has tried to do, briefly and schematically, is to indicate 
some of the ways in which inequality can be understood as participants’ issue. 
The paper has considered the way inequality talk is constructed, situated and 
oriented to action. A similar argument could be made of course for notions 
such as equality, domination, exploitation and superiority. It has particularly 
tried to highlight how taking seriously the study of these notions as members’ 
concerns requires us to take seriously the situated practices that they are 
embedded within. The paper ends with some broader observations.  
First, it should be emphasised again that this paper is illustrative and 
speculative. It is the prelude to a full scale study of the uses of ‘inequality’ in 
this material. Such a study might provide a more systematic account of the 
practices in which inequality constructions are employed. Second, although 
the paper has started with the notion ‘inequality’, there can be problems in 
starting in this way. One of the virtues of working with naturalistic material is to 
avoid flooding what is going on with pre-theorized social science categories. 
To try nevertheless to introduce such categories at such an early stage in the 
research can defeats this purpose. Conversely, working with material like this 
and being open to features of its organization and content that are 
unexpected can be analytically productive. This does not mean that such 
analysis might not be done against a backdrop of concerns with issues such 
as inequality or exploitation. It can be interesting to perform such research 
with an interest in critical or political or emancipatory issues. However, there 
would be less of an attempt to impose such issues on the material at the start 
of the analysis. Third, the analysis done here is non-cognitivist. The focus is 
on discursive constructions and practices which are understood in relation to 
actions. They are not treated as a consequence of inner states or objects. For 
example, we would not assume that either speaker in the material above has 
a particular, freestanding, mentally encoded representation of social inequality 
in general and being ‘on benefits’ in particular. Fourth, the relationship of this 
kind of research to classic social studies of inequality is complex. It certainly 
does not invalidate such studies. In part, what is signalled is a difference of 
emphasis. The kind of work discussed here considers inequality as a 
participants’ concern, while traditional studies of inequality have attempted to 
focus on actual differences between, say, the incomes of different social 
groups. The latter work is undoubtedly crucial for those developing a critical 
agenda. Although to some extend these styles of work are merely different 
and complementary, there are issues where an understanding of inequality in 
action may raise question about the basis of more traditional measures. Could 
it be that certain technical constructions of inequality are artefacts or 
reconstructions of practices where inequality is invoked for particular 
purposes? We have not attempted to show this in our current analysis; 
however, work on experiments, surveys and focus groups shows how such 
work might proceed (Antaki, 1999; Antaki & Rapley, 1996; Edwards & Potter, 
1993; Houtkoop-Steenstra, 2000, Puchta & Potter, 2002; Schegloff, 1999). 
Some might see the focus on members’ concerns as a move to increasingly 
micro analysis. However, a close attention to situated practices will inevitably 
bring into focus issues of history, institutions, culture and asymmetries as 
these things are reworked and reproduced as parts of participants’ practices. 
Explicating that, in that way, is the task of discursive constructionism.  
 
 
Appendix: Transcription Symbols  
 
 
[ ]   Square brackets mark the start and end of overlapping speech. Position them 
  in alignment where the overlap occurs. 
 
↑ ↓   Vertical arrows precede marked pitch movement, over and above normal 
  rhythms of speech. 
 
Underlining  Signals vocal emphasis; the extent of underlining within individual  
  words locates emphasis, but also indicates how heavy it is. 
 
CAPITALS  Mark speech that is obviously louder than surrounding speech (often  
  occurs when speakers are hearably competing for the floor, raised  
  volume rather than doing contrastive emphasis). 
 
°↑I know it,°  ‘Degree’ signs enclose obviously quieter speech (i.e., hearably   
  produced-as quieter, not just someone distant). 
 
(0.4)   Numbers in round brackets measure pauses in seconds (in this case, 4  
  tenths of a second). Place on new line if not assigned to a speaker. 
 
(.)   A micropause, hearable but too short to sensibly measure. 
 
she wa::nted  Colons show degrees of elongation of the prior sound; the more   
  colons, the more elongation. 
  
hhh   Aspiration (out-breaths); proportionally as for colons. 
 
.hhh   Inspiration (in-breaths); proportionally as for colons. 
 
Yeh,   ‘Continuation’ marker, speaker has not finished; marked by fall-rise or  
  weak rising intonation, as when enunciating lists. 
 
y’know?  Question marks signal stronger, ‘questioning’ intonation, irrespective of  
  grammar. 
 
Yeh.   Periods (full stops) mark falling, stopping intonation (‘final contour’),  
  irrespective of grammar, and not necessarily followed by a pause. 
 
bu-u-   hyphens mark a cut-off of the preceding sound. 
 
>he said<  ‘greater than’ and ‘lesser than’ signs enclose speeded-up talk. 
 
solid.=   ‘Equals’ signs mark the immediate ‘latching’ of successive talk, whether  
  of one 
 
=We had  or more speakers, with no interval. 
heh heh  Voiced laughter. 
 
sto(h)p i(h)t  Laughter within speech is signalled by h’s in round brackets. 
 
uh um   noises such as ‘er’ and ‘erm’. 
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